Currency crises and some theoretical approaches. Evolution of the currency crises in Romania by Alexandru Olteanu & Madalina Radoi
75 
 
 
CURRENCY CRISES AND SOME THEORETICAL 
APPROACHES. EVOLUTION OF THE CURRENCY CRISES IN 
ROMANIA 
 
 
Alexandru Olteanu
 
Mădălina Rădoi
 
 
 
Abstract 
The evolution of financial-currency phenomena after the `90s and, in particular, in the last 
decade, has disrupted the financial-currency relationships with serious consequences on the monetary-
currency balance in a series of countries with extension at regional or international level, as well as on 
the economic balance. The discussion of theories regarding the currency crises in their evolution is one 
of the matters designed to clarify the causes of such crises, the implications in the financial-banking, 
economic  environment,  as  well  as  the  possible  ways  to  limit  the  negative  effects  disrupting  the 
financial and economic balance in the given countries, as well as at regional and international. 
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Introduction 
The prevention of systemic crises (and in particular of currency crises) has started to 
raise a growing interest, especially in the last decade of the last century, following the crises 
of the European Monetary System (1992), Mexico (1994), in the countries of South-Eastern 
Asia, as  well as  in  Thailand, Malaysia,  Indonesia, Philippines,  South Korea (1997) or in 
Russia (1998). 
The  economic  literature  distinguishes  between  three  patterns  of  financial  crises: 
currency, banking and external debt crises. However, in practice there are no pure forms of 
crises. A special concept in the economic theory in this respect is that of Twin Crises – the 
currency and the banking sector crises. The crises in Asia (1997), Russia (1998) or Turkey 
(2000) are good examples. Other forms of complex crises are the currency and fiscal crises: 
Brazil (1999) or currency and external debt crises: Mexico (1994), Argentina (2001), USA 
(2007), and Europe (2009).  
 
1.  Theoretical approaches 
It  is  difficult  to  formulate  a  clear  and  precise  definition  of  currency  crises.  An 
approximate definition could be the loss of confidence in the national currency, expressed by 
increased demand to exchange the domestic currency for a foreign currency, which leads 
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either to the strong devaluation/depreciation of the national currency, or to the decrease in 
currency reserves or restrictions on capital movements [1]. 
(A) In the economic literature, financial crises are categorized into three generations of 
models. Opinions are divided as regards this classification: some authors, such as Krugman 
(1998), consider only two generations of models: the speculative financial crises are included 
in the last type of models. The first generation of models was introduced by Krugman (1979) 
[2]  and  subsequently  developed  by  Flood  and  Garber  (1984).  According  to  this  type  of 
models, in the context of a fixed exchange rate, an expansion of excess credit in relation to the 
increase in money demand leads to a gradual, but persistent, loss of international reserves, and 
eventually to a speculative attack on the exchange rate. Companies realize they will record 
losses if they hold domestic currency and, consequently, they sell it right when the so-called 
shadow exchange rate is equal to the fixed exchange-rate („shadow exchange rate” is the 
exchange rate that would exist is the exchange rate was not fixed), reserves are exhausted and 
the authorities are forced to abandon the parity. This model characterizes times of crisis as 
times  when  the  currency  reserves  of  authorities  decrease  persistently,  and  internal  credit 
increases more rapidly than the money demand. If the excess supply of money is the result of 
the need to finance the public sector, than the large fiscal deficits and the credit to the public 
sector may serve as crisis indicators. 
Agenor, Bhandari and Flood (1992) [3], suggest that, according to this crisis version, 
variables of external nature, such as the real exchange rate, may serve as crisis indicators as 
well. For instance, the deterioration of the trade balance and the current account may be the 
result of expansionary fiscal and/or credit policies, which may lead to an increase in demand 
for import goods and for a part of the previously exported goods. Moreover, the relative price 
of services increases, due to the fact that expansionary policies lead to an increase in related 
demand. Consequently, the price level is high, which leads to a real appreciation of currency. 
Thus, variations in the real exchange rate may be considered crisis indicators. 
More recent models suggest that the authorities abandon parity not only due to the 
decrease in reserves, but also following the evolution of other variables. 
Ozkan and Sutherland (1995) [4] highlight that the authorities have an objective that 
depends positively on maintaining the nominal fixed exchange rate and negatively on the 
deviations of production in relation to a given target level. Thus, in case of a fixed exchange 
rate, an increase in international interest rates leads to higher domestic interest rates and to a 
lower production level, decreasing the cost of maintaining parity. According to this argument, 
the  evolution  of  interest  rates  at  domestic  and  international  level,  as  well  as  the  GDP 
variations  may  be  considered  crisis  indicators.  Extending  the  reasoning,  other  variables 
affecting the objective-function of the authorities may be considered crisis indicators. High 
interest  rates  lead  to  increased  financing  costs  to  the  central  administration.  Thus,  an 
important public debt will show a greater inclination to abandon the peg. 
Moreover, high interest rates may generate vulnerabilities in the banking sector, and 
authorities would rather devaluate the currency than risk a collapse of the banking system, 
associated with much higher costs due to the guarantees offered on the liabilities side of the 
banks,  respectively  for  guaranteeing  deposits.  Thus,  indicators  such  as  the  level  of 
nonperforming loans, credit facilities granted to banks by the central bank, reduced deposits, 
may indicate financial crises. 
This first generation of models clearly describes the crises of the 8
th and 9
th decades of 
20
th century in the countries of Latin America, such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Fixed 
exchange regimes were introduced as a result of stabilization programs in order to reduce 
inflation and to control the budget deficit. In most cases, they ended in one of the ways 77 
 
described above: the fixed exchange rate was abandoned due to the rapid growth of domestic 
credit (generally following the bankruptcy of commercial banks) and a significant reduction 
of international reserves of the central bank. 
The self-fulfilling crises are the main characteristic of the second generation models 
[5].  This  type  of  models  is  characterized  by  the  possibility  of  the  existence  of  multiple 
balances, while the economy may vary between them without a significant change in real 
variables. 
For  instance,  the  existence  of  exchange  rate  collapse  expectations  leads  to  higher 
interest rates. This generates additional costs for authorities, which may decide to abandon the 
peg, thus validating the initial expectations. Also, they do not necessarily imply the existence 
of negative aspects at the level of the real sector. 
A sudden worsening of expectations alone is sufficient to generate the abandoning of 
the peg and the transfer to another balance with a flexible exchange rate. The problem that 
remains is related to the causes generating the sudden change of expectations and the extent to 
which such causes are correlated to the existence of deficits in the real sector. 
This approach involves the idea that the prediction of currency crises is extremely 
difficult,  due  to  the  inexistence  of  a  clear  connection  between  the  real  variables  and  the 
occurrence of crises. In the absence of perfect information, Moris and Shin (1998) [6] show 
that real variables matter in the occurrence of a crisis when they deteriorate below a certain 
value. 
(B) Second generation models explain a series of crises, such as the one in the ERM 
(Exchange Rate Mechanism) applied to the European Monetary System since the beginning 
of last decade. In this case, the unification of Germany generated a great shock of demand in 
this  country, which led  to  higher interest  rates  in  the other Member States.  Since labour 
markets are very rigid at European level, the effect was an increase in unemployment, likely 
to generate an attack on the currency. Moreover, these expectations increased interest rates, 
raising again the costs of authorities associated with maintaining a fixed exchange regime and 
generating a series of speculative attacks, which forced the authorities to abandon the peg. 
(C) The third generation of models combines the first two and introduces a series of 
microeconomic elements into the analysis, such as variables related to the banking sector. The 
development of these models increased after the Asian crisis. The Southeast Asian countries 
did not have extremely expansionary monetary or fiscal policies. Inflation and unemployment 
rates were low. There were problems with banks and companies, and their outbreak led to the 
crisis.  In particular, the moral  hazard issues,  the liquidity crunch and  contagion  elements 
represented the essential components of the crisis. 
Firstly, moral hazard comes from a close connection of financial institutions with the 
governments in the region, which induced the idea of the existence of implied governmental 
guarantees  in  relation  to  financing.  This  generated,  on  the  one  hand,  over-indebtedness 
(especially external), and on the other hand, suboptimal investment decisions. Thus, a shock, 
even  low,  at  the  level  of  asset  prices  generated  a  significant  deterioration  of  the  banks’ 
portfolios. Authorities were forced to intervene by inflationist measures in order to save the 
banking sector. This leads to a crisis in the balance of payments [7]. According to this type of 
models, the level of asset prices may serve as a good indicator to detect currency crisis. 
Secondly,  the  liquidity  crunch  starts  from  diminished  confidence  in  the  banking 
system,  which  leads  to  increased  withdrawals  from  the  system,  reducing  the  liquidity  of 
banks, thus generating a crisis of the banking sector and, subsequently, a currency crisis. 
According to this argument, the main factors that may affects the liquidity of the banking 78 
 
sector may serve as crisis indicators: short-term external debt at banking level, on the one 
hand, and long-term capital inflows, on the other hand [8]. 
Finally, the contagion effect involves the spreading of currency crises across borders 
and  their  transmission  to  other  countries.  This  may  be  the  result  of  a  devaluation  or 
depreciation based on competitiveness problems of the external sector or what is known as the 
common lender effect, according to which, when an investor suffers losses in one country, it 
liquidates  its  investments  in  another  country  as  well.  There  is  also  the  possibility  of  an 
irrational behaviour generated by the herding behaviour. 
Kaminskz, Lizondo and Reihart (1998) [9] examined 28 empirical studies regarding 
currency crises and organized the 46 used variables into 10 categories: (1) capital account; (2) 
debt  profile;  (3)  current  account;  (4)  international  variables;  (5)  financial  liberalization 
indicators; (6) other financial variables; (7) real sector; (8) fiscal sector; (9) political variables; 
(10) institutional factors. 
The  authors  characterized  the  explanation  degree  of  variables  by  examining  the 
number  of  studies  in  which  the  given  variables  had  a  significant  degree  of  relevance  in 
explaining the crises. Thus, the factors that had a high degree of explanation were: currency 
reserves, real exchange rate, increase of nongovernmental credit, level of credit to the public 
sector and inflation. Other indicators proposed to be considered, with a relatively good degree 
of  predicting  crises,  are:  trade  balance,  performance  at  the  level  of  exports,  increase  of 
monetary  supply,  M2/reserves,  increase  of  real  GDP  and  fiscal  deficit.  The  influence  of 
political and institutional variables is difficult to assess, due to their presence in only a few 
studies. 
On the contrary, the variables associated with the external debt profile and the current 
account balance had very poor performances, which was most likely due to the inclusion of 
information provided by these indicators in the developments of the indicator related to the 
real exchange rate. 
A more recent study on the empirical research regarding currency crises is the one 
made by Michael Chui (2002) [10]. The study has greater relevance also due to the fact that 
the summary made by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Rienhart (1998) [11] contained only events 
that  occurred  until  the  end  of  the  year  1997.  In  addition  to  the  indicators  present  in  the 
previous  studies  as  well  (overvaluation  of  the  real  exchange  rate,  increase  of  real  GDP, 
exports and fiscal deficit), a series of new indicators (related to the Asian crisis, the crises in 
Russia, Brazil) connected to the weaknesses seen in the banking sector, such as the increased 
dependence of financial systems on the authorities, acquire great relevance. 
2. Forms of currency crisis and evolution of the banking system in Romania 
Starting with the years 1997-1999, the financial-currency system in Romania has dealt 
with a system crisis, in which the financial-currency crisis manifested in hard forms, which 
are also maintained at present. 
During the above-mentioned period, the RON devaluated by more than 100%, thus 
reaching an annual average of over 15,000 RON for one dollar in 1999, as compared to an 
average of almost 9,000 RON for one dollar in 1998 and 7,000 RON for one dollar in 1997. 
During 2009-2012, the RON devaluation resumed (only in the first 10 months of the year 
2012, the RON devaluation to the euro was 5%).  
If  we  make  a  comparison  between  the  current  crisis  and  1997-1999,  the  banking 
system suffered drastic mutilations, with over 10 banks disappearing, among which Bancorex 
(the biggest bank in the country) and the Agricultural Bank, the reason being the large volume 79 
 
of financing, especially in foreign currency, granted to state companies, which were strongly 
affected by the crisis at that time. Of course, if we compare the current crisis and the 1997 
crisis, a common point is the macroeconomic imbalance. At that time, the strong devaluation 
of the national currency contributed to the massive increase of inflation, which was around 
150%, but also to the increase of interests, which had reached 30-50% for credits and even 
over 100%. 
Since 2009, the financial-currency and banking industry, not only in Romania but in 
the whole world, has been at an historical crossroad in its development. The reason why we 
got here is the strong erosion of trust in this industry. It is known that a financial-currency and 
banking system cannot exist without trust, since there is a close connection between trust, 
ethics and the carrying out of financial-currency and banking services. The strong devaluation 
of  euro  is  relevant  in  this  respect,  especially  as  a  result  of  the  sovereign  debts  of  some 
countries in Europe (Greece, Island, Portugal, Spain, Italy), which exceeded by much the 
100% share of the given countries’ GDPs, a situation that also influenced the evolution of the 
RON/euro exchange rate. At the beginning of October 2012, the RON devaluation of over 5% 
in relation to the euro (4.60 RON for one euro) as compared to the end of the year 2011 and 
the RON devaluation of over 15% in relation to the dollar (3.63 RON for one dollar in 2012 
as compared to 3.33 RON for one dollar at the end of the year 2011). The situation of this 
exchange rate is also a consequence of the political disputes in Romania. 
The National Bank of Romania assures us that the evolution of this exchange rate is 
similar to that of the zloty, the Czech crown or the forint, as can also be seen in the graphs 
attached (the daily nominal exchange rate) [12]. Like any currency with a controlled floating 
exchange rate, the central bank has the possibility to act directly in the market, by selling or 
buying foreign currency, or indirectly, by monetary policies. 
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Fig.1  Evolution  of  the  nominal  exchange  rate  in  Romania,  Poland,  the  Czech 
Republic and Hungary 
If we examine the graphs with the evolution of the annual variation, we see large 
amplitudes, the champion at his chapter, in 2011, being the Polish zloty, which came closest 
to what the economic theory calls free floating. 
The evolution  of the RON exchange rate in  the first  10 months  of the  year 2012 
indicates a devaluation of over 5% as compared to the end of the year 2011. 
The most significant devaluation took place in July 2012, when the exchange rate 
reached an historical level of 4.6997 RON/euro, namely 9.3% depreciation as compared to 
last year’s exchange rate. The RON depreciated abruptly from the beginning of July 2012, by 
4.2% by the end of the month, while the foreign currencies in the region recorded gains of up 
to 1.1%. 
The strong depreciation of the RON also influenced the level of interests applied by 
the commercial banks, which, for one-day term deposits, amounted to 4.78%-5.26% per year. 
Also, one-week maturity yields dropped from 4.86%-5.34% to 4.83%-5.32% per year.  
The governor of the Romanian National Bank of Romania specified that "The impact 
of the external evolution on the exchange rate has been minor until present. The exchange rate 
is also influenced by what comes from the outside. We see it first in the risk premium and 
then in the exchange rate. Until now, the impact has been minor and we see no reason for a 
greater impact”. 81 
 
Of  course,  such  a  depreciation  of  the  RON  increases  the  competitiveness  of  the 
Romanian  products  in  the  external  markets  and  leads  to  economic  growth.  Under  such 
circumstances, the exchange rate may be a valve only for the imbalances accumulated in the 
economy. However, you must have production overcapacity or rapid investments, or fields 
such as the agriculture, where increases of 10% can make the difference. 
We  should  not  forget  that  the  devaluation  of  the  national  currency,  as  a  result  of 
vulnerable structures in the economy, such as the case of Romania, where a relatively high 
degree of exports (the exports to Germany, Italy and France represent approximately 40% of 
total exports) includes imports whose prices rise, makes an increase in the exchange rate to 
be felt in costs. 
We can agree that, by the depreciation of the national currency, an opportunity is 
offered to the domestic producers to regain the domestic market by eliminating imports, but in 
this case as well, investments and the increase of production capacities are needed. 
We  should  not  omit  the  impact  of  the  exchange  rate  depreciation  on  the  level  of 
interests. 
It is worth mentioning that a strong depreciation of the national currency in relation to 
the main credit denomination currencies would have a positive impact on interest income. 
However,  this  would  be  counterbalanced  by  the  much  higher  expenses  related  to  the 
depreciation of the quality of financial assets, especially in the case of debtors natural persons. 
The  currency  risk  manifested  by  the  direct  impact  of  the  exchange  rate  variation  on  the 
financial situation of credit institutions is low. The maximum VAR value recorded during the 
2010-2011 period, which involves a liquidation of uncovered positions within 10 working 
days, does not exceed 0.25 % of total equity. 
One of the mechanisms for balancing the financial markets following depreciation of 
the exchange rate is available to the State. 
Discussing  the  relationship  between  the  State  and  the  financial  markets  subject  to 
imbalances, the Austrian professor Jorg Guido Hulsmann [13] mentioned that “one of the 
State’s mechanisms of intervention in the financial markets is the manipulation of prices in 
the financial markets”. The manipulation of prices can be achieved through numerous means, 
such as: the control of the inflation rate or the control of precious metals price”. 
 
Conclusions 
At present, in the academic environment, it is acknowledged that, at real level, the 
currency crises are a mixture of important elements belonging to the three above-mentioned 
categories. Anyway, in times of crisis, some aspects seem to hold a more important role than 
others. Having this description in theory, it is important to verify at empirical level whether 
the variables belonging to the real or banking sector may serve as indicators of crisis. On the 
other hand, if these variables are not convincing as indicators of crisis, the proper conclusion 
is that the given crises are a result of self-fulfilling expectations and of the herding behaviour 
at the level of companies. 
The depreciation of the actual real exchange rate in Romania, starting with the second 
half of the year 2011, involved an improvement in external competitiveness with favourable 
effects on the future net exports. The nominal depreciation of the exchange rate in relation to 
the  Euro  and  the  US  Dollar  acted,  mainly,  in  this  respect.  It  occurred  in  the  context  of 
deterioration of the investors’ perception of the perspectives of economies in the region as a 
result of the uncertainty related to financing the public debt of Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, 82 
 
and Ireland. The increase of the investors’ aversion to risk was also reflected in the ascending 
quarterly dynamics of the credit default swap (CDS) spreads for a series of countries in the 
region,  including  Romania.  In  relation  to  the  impulse  transmitted  through  the  net  export 
channel, the developments of the exchange rate and the sovereign risk premium in the last 
quarters induce a restrictive effect on the future economic activity by increasing the cost of 
credit in foreign currency, a phenomenon that has manifested since early 2012. 
In  conclusion,  even  if,  on  short-term,  the  increase  of  the  exchange  rate  helps  the 
achievement of the budget deficit targets provided for in the agreement with the IMF, on 
medium and long-term, the impact on the economy is worrying. Bigger problems regarding 
the  public  debt  (denominated  in  an  important  share  in  foreign  currency),  the  increase  of 
inflation (depreciation leads to the increase of inflation), the increase of the risk of default on 
bank loans, the increase of interests will certainly appear. 
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